


JPRS-TND-93-018
14 June 1993




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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-018

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14 June 1993

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SOUTH AFRICA

Reportage on Filling-In Defense Nuclear Test Shafts

IAEA To Supervise Filling-In

*MB0606165093 Johannesburg Radio South Africa
Network in English 1600 GMT 6 Jun 93*

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency is to supervise the filling-in of the underground nuclear test shafts at the defense force's Vastrap grounds in the northern Cape.

State President F.W. de Klerk disclosed in March that South Africa has manufactured six nuclear devices which could be converted into weapons at short notice. He also revealed the existence of a nuclear weapons test site in the Kalahari desert near Upington. The site, however, was never used to test any nuclear bombs.

South Africa has since given effect to its commitment to the Strategic Weapons Treaty which it signed in 1991 by tabling legislation banning the production of weapons of mass destruction.

Further on Filling-In

*MB0806063393 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network
in Afrikaans 1800 GMT 7 Jun 93*

[Text] A chapter in the history of South Africa's secret nuclear arms development was today concluded in the northern Cape.

This follows South Africa's signing of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty earlier this year and the destruction of

its nuclear technology. Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] this morning began destroying two secret nuclear weapon test shafts near Upington. The process will take about three weeks to complete. Andries van Zyl reports.

[Van Zyl] The Kalahari dune fields, about 80 kilometers north east of Upington, is the scene where South Africa's two secret nuclear test shafts were sunk in the mid-seventies. One of the shafts is currently inside a galvanized iron trench and the other, about a kilometer further, is in open veld.

The shafts, less than a meter in diameter, have a vertical depth of between 260 and 385 meters. Because no nuclear tests were conducted in the shafts, they have been underground all these years and sealed off with a steel plate and thick concrete blocks. This video material from Armscor shows how the steel plates were removed earlier this month and the concrete blocks removed by the use of explosives to open the shafts.

The filling-in process created unexpected problems from the beginning with the interaction of underground water in the shaft, air, and the soil, which was being pushed in. Some of the soil blew out of the shaft and this delayed the filling process considerably. To ensure that the shafts were not drilled open again, at 100 meter intervals a layer of concrete and scrap-iron is placed between the sand and the holes. The filling-in, due to be completed within the next three weeks, is also being watched by the International Atomic Energy Commission.

Armscor today said that when Vastrap's [tread down] test trenches have been filled, South Africa's era of nuclear weapons development will have ended.

Qian Qichen Vows No Missile Sales to Iran, Syria
OW0606153193 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 22, 31 May - 6 Jun 93 pp 6-7

[Report by staff reporter Xiong Zhou: "No Missiles Sold to Iran, Syria"]

[Excerpt] Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on May 20 promised his Israeli counterpart Shim'on Peres that China will not sell missiles to Iran and Syria, and said that China has not sold missiles to this region in the past.

Qian said that China does not want to put obstacles in the way of the Middle East peace process.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China will continue to make efforts to promote the peace process in the Middle East, he said.

Peres arrived in Beijing on May 19 on a six-day official visit to China. This is his first trip to China since he became foreign minister last July. During his trip, Peres signed a cultural agreement with Chinese Culture Minister Liu Zhongde, and visited Beijing University where he delivered a speech. He also visited a Jewish residential area in Shanghai. [passage omitted]

NORTH KOREA

U.S. 'Threats' of Sanction Prior to Talks Denounced

SK0906014393 Seoul YONHAP in English
0127 GMT 9 Jun 93

[Text] United Nations, June 8 [date as received] (YONHAP)—North Korea accused the United States on Tuesday [8 June] of resorting to threats and pressure when it agreed to negotiations and warned Washington that it would be responsible if the talks collapsed.

"It's just not possible that it was the United States who proposed the date for the third contact but then it announces a statement making threats," Ho Chong, North Korean deputy chief of mission to the United Nations, said.

Ho, in a meeting he requested with South Korean reporters, said he "cannot but be disappointed" if Monday's statement reflected the U.S. Government's position.

Pyongyang and Washington meet Thursday for a third round of talks on solving North Korea's nuclear problem. The United States at minimum wants North Korea to promise it will stay in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT becomes official on June 12, and Thursday's contact is seen as the last negotiation before the international community starts taking tougher actions on the communist regime.

U.S. State Department Spokesman Mike McCurry told a press briefing Monday that two previous rounds were disappointing. He said the United States and its allies would discuss sanction measures if the third round was also unfruitful.

"The United States should come to the third meeting with sincerity," said Ho, "the talks will find a compromise if the United States comes to it with an attitude of mutual respect, not of might."

IAEA Meets To Consider DPRK's Refusal To Allow Inspections

AU0706143093 Paris AFP in English
1300 GMT 7 Jun 93

[Text] Vienna, June 7 (AFP)—Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began a week-long meeting here Monday that will discuss North Korea's continued refusal to allow special inspections of a disputed nuclear center.

The 35-member board of governors will also discuss reportedly precarious safety conditions at nuclear power stations in the former Soviet bloc.

A North Korean decision to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] is due to take effect from Saturday.

The agency has been pressing for months for access to a nuclear research complex at Yongbyon, 100 kilometres (60 miles) from the capital Pyongyang, where it is suspected the authorities have stock-piled weapons-grade nuclear material and are developing a secret nuclear weapons programme.

North Korea says the site is a military installation of no special interest, and denies having a nuclear weapons project.

Talks with the United States and South Korea to make North Korea change its mind about quitting the NPT have come to nothing.

The agency has referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council, which last month criticised the North Korean stand.

During their meeting, the governors are also expected to nominate Hans Blix of Sweden for a fourth four-year term as the agency's director-general. The reappointment must be confirmed by the body's general assembly scheduled for September.

Japanese Source Says DPRK Test-Fired Scud Missiles

SK1106233493 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
2212 GMT 11 Jun 93

[By reporter Yu Kyun from Tokyo]

[Text] A Japanese Government source said that in addition to No. 1 Nodong missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers, North Korea has also test-fired various kinds of missiles such as the Scud-B with a range of 300 kilometers, and the Scud-C with a range of 500 kilometers.

Japanese Authorities Said To Try To Attain 'Sinister Aim'

SK1006053393 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0419 GMT 10 Jun 93

["Base Trick To Become Nuclear Power"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 10 (KCNA)—The Japanese authorities are trying to attain their sinister aim, raising more hysteric outcries over the "nuclear problem" of the DPRK.

According to YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa at the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors on June 7 took issue with the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He drivelled that the "development of nuclear weapons by North Korea poses a direct threat to Japan."

This was a crafty ruse to bring international "sanctions" and pressure against the DPRK on the unreasonable charge of "development of nuclear weapons" and a base trick to justify the wild ambition of Japan to become a nuclear power.

As is known, the "nuclear problem" of the DPRK is a false rumor invented by the United States. The United States manipulated some officials of the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency to demand a "special inspection" of our Republic. These days it is trying to take "sanctions" against the DPRK at the U.N. Security Council over its withdrawal from the NPT.

The Japanese reactionaries, chiming in with the United States in such "nuclear pressure", are raising a hue and cry over the "threat" of the DPRK. This is preposterous, indeed.

It is, in fact, not the DPRK which has neither intention nor capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons but Japan which is hastening its conversion into a nuclear power, that threatens peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

It is an open secret that Japan continues shipping in plutonium from Britain and France and has built 40 odd atomic power plants in the country wholly with domestic equipment.

Japan can become a nuclear power in a moment any time.

Not without reason did the U.S. Heritage Foundation note that Japan was a state which could threaten East Asia with nuclear weapons and conventional weapons.

Japan should not forget its historical lesson as a nuclear victim but give up at once the development of its own nuclear weapons seriously threatening peace and security of Asia and the world.

Envoy Says Country Ready for UN Sanctions

*SK0806002693 Seoul YONHAP in English
0007 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Excerpts] United Nations, June 7 (YONHAP)—Ho Chong, minister at the North Korean Mission to the United Nations, said Monday the success or failure of the third U.S.-North Korean high-level meeting Thursday would depend "entirely" on the United States. [passage omitted]

"Since we (North Korea) have declared our intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we are prepared to meet economic sanctions of the United Nations Security Council," Ho said. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministers Agree on North Nuclear Issue

*SK0706103993 Seoul YONHAP in English
1023 GMT 7 Jun 93*

[Text] Moscow, June 7 (YONHAP)—South Korea and Russia agreed here on Monday to help strengthen the world community's cooperative measures to resolve North Korea's nuclear question.

The agreement was reached at a meeting between Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu, now on an official visit here, and his Russian counterpart, Minister Andrey Kozyrev. The meeting, held at the Russian Foreign Ministry's guest house, was followed by their luncheon.

During the meeting, Minister Han said that unless North Korea reverses its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by June 12, it would be important for the international community to take a firmer action against North Korea.

Minister Kozyrev observed that North Korea may shortly make an affirmative measure over the NPT issue.

"However, to prepare against possible rejection by North Korea of international efforts to resolve the nuclear question, Russia would positively cooperate in strengthening the international cooperative system," Kozyrev was quoted as saying by Choe Song-hong, Korean Foreign Ministry's director-general for European affairs, who was present at the meeting.

Minister Han is scheduled to pay a courtesy call on President Boris Yeltsin at the Kremlin on Tuesday afternoon to convey to him President Kim Yong-sam's personal message.

At their meeting Monday, the two foreign ministers agreed on the need of a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia. They also shared the view that it would be desirable to develop a multilateral regional security system on a long-term basis.

At the end of the meeting, the two ministers exchanged the letters of ratification of the Korea-Russia basic treaty, vowing that they would further develop bilateral cooperative relations.

Minister Kozyrev, in particular, requested that President Kim Yong-sam would make [as received] an official visit to Russia.

Turning to issues pending between the two countries, the Russian foreign minister asked Korea to resume extending its economic cooperation loans to Russia.

Minister Han suggested that the two countries work out a resolution of the issue after the financial authorities of the two sides had full discussion of the question.

Russia also called for Korea's political decision over the question of the ownership of a Seoul land where a tsarist Russian legation building once sat. Minister Han said

the two sides could resolve the question after bilateral working-level talks further reviewed legal aspects involved.

The meeting further discussed Russia's recent control of fishing on the high seas of the Okhotsk.

Han said the unilateral fishing ban imposed there runs counter to the international law that features the principle of free fishing on international waters.

The Korean minister suggested that fishing should be allowed on the high seas and that scientific studies be conducted at the same time to work out ways to preserve fish resources there.

Minister Han asked Minister Kozyrev to cooperate in the reinstatement of ethnic Koreans' Russian citizenship in line with the recent congressional resolution on the rehabilitation of the honor of ethnic Koreans in the Central Asian zone.

Kozyrev Warns of 'Increasingly Tough Obstacles' for DPRK

*LD0706125593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1233 GMT 7 Jun 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Georgiy Shmelyov]

[Text] Moscow June 7 TASS—"The Russian Federation and South Korea are fully determined to build up positive potential of deepening bilateral relations," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said at a ceremony of the exchange of instruments of ratification on putting a bilateral treaty on fundamentals of relations between the two countries into effect.

Assessing the results of his talks with South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu, Kozyrev said that the sides "had an interesting exchange of opinions on a number of international issues, including on the problem of the inadmissibility of undermining a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the return of North Korea into the framework of this treaty."

For his part, Han Sung-chu said that "there are no problems between Russia and South Korea and that the two countries are seeking to develop bilateral relations and cooperate in the international arena." Both sides voiced a unanimous opinion that it is necessary that North Korea resume its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Asked about Russia's actions on North Korea's return to the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Kozyrev said that Russia was taking actions at an international level, discussing this issue at the U.N. Security Council, at the IAEA and with North Korea directly. "It should be clear to Pyongyang that we consider the violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and withdrawal from the treaty inadmissible and hope that the North Korean leadership will review its

decision. On the way of distancing itself from this treaty, North Korea will face increasingly tough obstacles from the whole international community, including Russia," Kozyrev said.

SOUTH KOREA

Government Plans Steps Following U.S.-DPRK Meeting

Official To Consider Talks

*SK1006035993 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0315 GMT 10 Jun 93*

[Text] The parliamentary committee for foreign affairs and national reunification held a full session today with Unification Minister Han Wan-sang to discuss the promotion of the South-North dialogue on the North Korean nuclear issue.

At the meeting Minister Han said: [passage omitted] North Korea is using the nuclear issue as a means to guarantee its foremost cause of maintaining its current system. If North Korea proposes South-North talks after ending today's U.S.-North Korean talks without result, I will carefully consider it.

Minister Stresses Need To Discuss Issue

*SK1006060393 Seoul YONHAP in English
0539 GMT 10 Jun 93*

[Text] Seoul, June 10 (YONHAP)—Deputy Prime Minister Han Wan-sang said Thursday that he didn't expect North Korea to accept South Korea's offer to discuss both the nuclear issue and an exchange of special envoys unless it changed its mind on leaving the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT].

Han, speaking in a meeting with members of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and National Unification Committee, said he did not rule out Pyongyang's attending a proposed vice minister-level meeting with South Korea if its high-level meeting with the United States in New York on Thursday resulted in agreement.

"It is our position that discussion of the envoy exchange issue is possible only when North Korea shows a positive change in its attitude toward a solution of the nuclear issue, making a reversal of its NPT pullout decision and fulfilling its commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," said Han, who is also unification minister.

Whether the proposed working-level contact to improve inter-Korean relations took place was entirely dependent upon North Korea's stance on the nuclear issue, he told the committee.

North Korea reportedly showed in its talks with the United States in New York that even if it removed the obligation to undergo IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections by pulling out of the NPT, the IAEA may be asked to participate in solution of the

nuclear issue in the context of the joint South-North statement for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, Han said.

"This North Korean position runs squarely counter to the joint South Korea-U.S. approach to the nuclear issue, and accordingly the nuclear negotiations face tough going unless North Korea retracts its NPT pullout decision and abides by the nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA," he said.

To Seek UN Sanctions If U.S. Talks Fail

SK1006083193 Seoul YONHAP in English
0821 GMT 10 Jun 93

[Text] Seoul, June 10 (YONHAP)—South Korea will seek UN sanctions against North Korea if Washington and Pyongyang fail to reach an agreement in their high-level meeting in New York on Thursday.

The government would consult with UN Security Council (UNSC) member nations about whether the second UNSC action on North Korea should be a statement issued in the name of the council chairman or a resolution, and whether it should include sanctions, though this would depend on the outcome of the meeting, Vice Foreign Minister Hong Sun-yong said Thursday in a closed-door meeting with members of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and National Unification Committee.

Hong predicted that the third round of the high-level talks Thursday would be a watershed in UNSC diplomacy to discuss whether or not to slap sanctions on North Korea.

In the first and second rounds of the talks, North Korea said it had decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] as a state of sovereign authority and it would be hard to return, Hong said.

North Korea appeared to be trying to solve the nuclear issue through negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency outside of the NPT regime, as Brazil did, he added.

Also at the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Han Wansang expressed a pessimistic view on the future of inter-Korean contacts if the U.S.-North Korea talks break up.

"It is possible that North Korea will offer to resume inter-Korean contact in a bid to avoid international pressure and sanctions, and the government has to work out measures against such a possibility," said Han, who is also unification minister.

President Praises PRC Efforts To Resolve DPRK Nuclear Issue

SK0806085593 Seoul YONHAP in English
0806 GMT 8 Jun 93

[Excerpt] Seoul, June 8 (YONHAP)—President Kim Yong-sam commended China for its effort to solve the North Korean nuclear problem in a meeting with Tian Jiyun, first vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress, at Chongwadae on Tuesday afternoon.

Kim, saying he knew that China was well aware of the importance of the issue to the peace of Northeast Asia, said he expected it to continue playing a constructive role in the international community's endeavors to solve the problem. [passage omitted]

Daily Interviews DPRK Ambassador to Austria on NPT

SK0806071193 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
8 Jun 93 p 5

[Interview with Kim Kwang-sop, DPRK ambassador to Austria, by Vienna-based correspondent Pae Myong-pok at the International Atomic Energy Agency building in Vienna on 7 June concerning North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and U.S.-DPRK high-level talks]

[Text] [Correspondent Pae Myong-pok] There is some opinion in the world that 12 June should not be the day when North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] should take effect.

[Ambassador Kim Kwang-sop] I do not know whether such world opinion exists or not. However, there is no doubt that 12 June is the day when [North Korea's] withdrawal from the NPT will take effect legally. When our Foreign Ministry announced a statement on our decision to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March, we informed the UN Security Council of the decision and, at the same time, sent the statement to NPT member countries by fax through our UN Mission in New York. I can show a copy of this as evidence, if necessary.

[Pae] I understand there are many NPT member countries who have not been informed of this.

[Kim] That may be a failure at the working-level. However, I stress again that all legal procedures for informing all NPT member countries of our decision were completed three months ago.

[Pae] The day of North Korea's official withdrawal from the NPT is only five days away. Is there any possibility of a retraction of the decision to withdraw from the NPT before then?

[Kim] The third round of DPRK-U.S. high-level talks is scheduled for 10 June, and a North-South contact is to be held on 8 June to discuss the issue of exchanging

special envoys between the North and the South. If and when summit talks between North and South Korea are realized through exchanging special envoys, all issues, including the nuclear issue, can be discussed. In particular, we had agreed with the United States to hold one round of high-level talks originally, but they extended the talks and have agreed to hold the third round of talks. This reflects the two countries' sincere attitude to resolving problems. Let us wait for results from the talks.

[Pae] Do you mean that North Korea will cancel its decision to withdraw from the NPT?

[Kim] I cannot comment because I have not been informed of the results of the DPRK-U.S. talks.

[Pae] Can North Korea rejoin the NPT after leaving it?

[Kim] Withdrawal from the NPT and admission into it are matters for each country's sovereignty and what each country decides independently. How can an ambassador comment on a matter of this importance. Anyway, let us wait.

[Pae] Has North Korea's rejection of the special inspections [tukpyol sachal] of the two facilities [tugae isol], which the International Atomic Energy Agency has demanded, not changed?

[Kim] They are military facilities [kunsal isol]. Our official position that we reject special inspections of these military facilities remains unchanged.

[Pae] The United States has proposed mutual inspections and agreed on North Korean inspections of the U.S. military facilities in South Korea. Therefore, North Korea has no reason to reject inspections on the mere grounds that they are military facilities, does it?

[Kim] All of the issues, including this one, will be discussed at the DPRK-U.S. talks. I have merely reiterated our official position on this issue.

[Pae] The United Nations has already started to mention economic sanctions [kyongje cheje] against North Korea. What will happen if economic sanctions are imposed?

[Kim] We have been suffering already from virtual economic sanctions by the United States. Economic sanctions would have an adverse effect on North-South relations.

Joint DPRK Contact for 8 Jun Fails To Take Place

SK0806020593 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0100 GMT 8 Jun 93

[Text] The North Korean side has shown no reaction yet to our proposal for holding a working-level contact between representatives of North and South authorities

at 1000 today in Panmunjom to discuss the nuclear issue and the issue of exchanging special envoys. Consequently, the working-level contact was not realized.

A government official concerned said this morning: The North Korean side originally proposed for holding a working-level contact today [8 June], but has not sent any notice to our side yet, apparently on the pretext of our side's proposal calling for discussing the nuclear issue. Accordingly, our side did not send its two working-level representatives to Panmunjom.

The government official said: Success of the North-South working-level contact depends entirely on North Korea's attitude and North Korea's reservation in expressing its stance toward our proposal may be because it is reviewing its stand on the nuclear issue on the eve of the third U.S.-North Korean talks slated for 10 June.

Nuclear Issue Wanted on Agenda at Meeting With DPRK

SK0906032893 Seoul YONHAP in English
0319 GMT 9 Jun 93

[Text] Seoul, June 9 (YONHAP)—South Korea told North Korea on Wednesday [9 June] that it agreed to hold a working-level meeting at Panmunjom on Thursday, but that the agenda must include both the nuclear problem and an exchange of special envoys.

In a telephone message to his North Korean counterpart, Prime Minister Hwang In-song accepted the proposal but said that South Korea wanted to hold the working-level contact "in Tongilgak (in the northern half of Panmunjom) at 3 [0600 GMT] on Thursday afternoon to discuss a way to solve the nuclear issue and the envoy exchange issue."

Hwang said: "I take note of the fact that your side has recognized the nuclear issue as a matter of grave concern for immediate solution. I believe if both sides really intend to solve the nuclear issue, a breakthrough for the solution would be made in the working-level contact."

It is uncertain if North Korea will accept this new proposal by South Korea as it continues to insist on discussing only the exchange of envoys in the contact, saying the nuclear issue can be discussed in the course of exchanging the envoys.

On Tuesday, North Korea proposed that the meeting be in Tongilgak at 10 on Thursday morning to discuss the exchange only.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**Tuzla Authorities Contemplate Using 'Chlorine' for Defense***AU0906160093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Jun 93*

[Salih Brkic report from Tuzla]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] A session of the Tuzla District Council has been called for tomorrow at which the referendum question will be defined, which will concern 1 million people living on this, the largest of the free territories. [Words indistinct] to use chlorine and other chemical agents for defense purposes, bearing in mind that this involves the risk of self-destruction, but all this in the defense of human dignity. [passage omitted]

We propose to the residents of Tuzla district that they decide at the referendum whether to support our (?dramatic) decision that is [words indistinct] in the defense of human dignity. While the Chetnik helicopters fly every day without any sanctions, the announced flight of our helicopter [words indistinct] could have ended tragically because of the intervention by UN aircraft. [passage omitted]

CROATIA**Serb Scientist Reportedly Helps Build Nuclear Bomb***AU0706140093 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 93 p 14*

[J. Mladenovic report: "Atoms for Tudjman"]

[Text] Osijek, 4 June—Controversial scientist Dr. Stevan Dedijer (82), well-known nuclear physicist and director of the Swedish Institute for Research and Development at the University in Lund, elder brother of renowned historian Vladimir Dedijer, recently visited Osijek. Rumor has it that Dr. Dedijer was invited to Croatia to help with the construction of a nuclear bomb. The whole project is cleverly hidden behind the scientific seminar "The Intelligent Company" which took place recently in the Osijek Center for European Studies.

A Serb, Dr. Stevan Dedijer won the Croats' sympathy when he announced that he would "work for Croatia for an annual salary of one Croat dinar...."

"I will soon lecture in a Swedish company for a fee of \$2,000 per hour," says Dedijer. "I made an arrangement with the deputy prime minister of the Croatian government by which I would work on popularizing the idea of 'intelligent companies' in Croatia, for which I would be paid—one Croat dinar a year."

It doesn't often happen that a Serb defiles and sullies his people, their country and leadership, while at the same

time praises Croatia and the Croats who, with "a machine gun slung over their shoulder" are hurrying into Europe.

Dr. Stevan Dedijer had the chance to build a nuclear bomb way back in 1948. This is what he says about it:

"At the time, Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Djilas summoned me to Vinca, where they were planning to build a nuclear bomb. At the time I was against this crazy idea, and I began a fight against this project. I published an article in the ATOMIC SCIENTISTS' BULLETIN, and was taken in for questioning by Udba [former state security service]."

After the conflict with Udba, Dr. Dedijer fled the country with the help of Nobel Prize laureate, Nils Bor [name as transliterated]. He says he had been unable to convince Tito that the development of science and technology was the most important issue in Yugoslavia.

"This is what I am now trying to explain to Croatia and Zagreb," adds Dr. Dedijer. "I exclusively visited Osijek for the seminar on 'Intelligent Companies.' I still have to talk to Croat ministers and leaders. They need to be convinced that this is something that Japan and the West, who are going to fleece us, have been doing for 30 years. As a Serb, I want Croatia to fare well...."

"I have never had any problems with Croats. My mother taught me that. When, in 1928, they killed the Radic brothers in the People's Assembly, she said: 'This is the end of Yugoslavia. We have killed the leader of the Croat people, of course they are going to hate us,'" said Dedijer.

SLOVAKIA**Radioactive Substance Discovered; Ukraine Named as Source***LD0906174393 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1630 GMT 9 Jun 93*

[Text] A large quantity of a radioactive substance has been found in Slovakia. Correspondent Alexander Picha reports:

[Picha] A container full of a radioactive substance has been intercepted in the West Slovak region during a nationwide campaign aimed at protecting Slovakia's economic interests. An official source at the Slovak Interior Ministry said that the radioactive substance belonged to an unnamed, large Slovak firm. The company has the use of a vast plant, and also a helicopter.

Slovak experts are now investigating the possible purpose of the radioactive substance. The Slovak Interior Ministry puts the value of the radioactive contraband at 100 million korunas. The Slovak police identified the substance as originating from Ukraine.

During the campaign carried out by the Slovak police, customs and government officials, 13 other Slovak companies were checked. Peter Kuchar, the spokesman for the Interior Ministry, told me that Slovak officials had confiscated undocumented goods worth another 80 million korunas. The Slovak companies they had selected for investigation had mostly been smuggling electronic goods and alcohol. The Slovak Interior Ministry spokesman failed to reveal the extent to which the incompletely checked Czech and Slovak border is to blame for smuggling. The Interior Ministry said that it would take several days to draw conclusions from the campaign.

YUGOSLAVIA

Reportage on Serbian Cold Fusion Experiments

Experiments Said in Progress

PM0806151893 Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Jun 93
p 32

[Jerome Strazzulla article: "This 'Cold Bomb' That Serbia Covets"]

[Text] Convinced of an act of treachery and shocked by its media coverage, traditional physicists gave an assurance in 1989 that "in two years time there will be no more talk of cold fusion." They were thus wrong on at least one count. For three years now an increasing number of laboratories throughout the world (predominantly Japanese) have tried—and in some cases succeeded—to reproduce the Pons-Fleischmann experiment. Some theorists have tackled the task of explaining its unknown factors. Three physicists, two of them French, are at present trying to partly explain "cold fusion." Their hypothesis has two interesting features. It does not fundamentally conflict with traditional physical and chemical knowledge. And it is beginning to be checked out experimentally.

Their theory is based on the premise that at the low energy levels that Pons and Fleischmann used (equivalent to a domestic power point), "cold fusion" is marginal. But it also uses the premise that if you push the experimental conditions further the Pons-Fleischmann flask is metamorphosed into a small neutron reactor. A cold reactor or nearly cold. As always in nuclear matters the energy of a reactor is used in civilian application to generate electricity. In a much less civilian context it can produce an explosion. Just one team in the whole world is currently experimenting in these heightened conditions. In Belgrade. Whatever the motives and intentions of these physicists the nature of their work indicates that Serbia is looking to manufacture a small cold nuclear reactor.

The key member of the trio of theoretical physicists is the Frenchman Michel Rambaut, who retired a year ago from the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission] where he finished his career as a theoretical physicist in charge of

military applications. The second is the American Peter Graneau (from Northeastern University, Boston), who worked at MIT on the SDI program. The third is Jean-Pierre Vigier, one of the "nuclear founders" of the Joliot team, a postwar communist who refused to "make the bomb," a retired scientific director of the National Scientific Research Center, and above all an editor of the scientific review PHYSICS LETTER A. The latter is, after the PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS, the bible of the international physicists community. The majority of articles concerning cold fusion are published there. The three men met by chance in 1987 in connection with Ampere, a scientific enigma to do with the SDI program.

Credible and Atypical

Pons and Fleischmann in 1989 were not the first to cause a surge of iconoclastic neutrons. In 1974 the Lochte-Holtgreven team in Kiel, Germany, obtained neutrons by sending large electronic discharges (under 200 kilovolts) into a small (capillary) tube 1 mm in diameter filled with deuterium. The experiment was regarded by physicists at that time as credible and atypical. As the stream of neutrons was produced they noticed curious variations of electric current which were designated "deadened oscillatory mode in current" [regime oscillatoire amorti en courant]. It was also noted that the neutrons surged, unexpectedly, before the environment was at its hottest. The experiment was not thermonuclear despite the presence of fast neutrons (the hallmark of fusions).

In September 1989 a U.S. team led by Beuhler in Brookhaven also produced neutrons by firing "aggregates" (packets) of heavy water at a target of titanium immersed in deuterium. For Michel Rambaut a phenomenon common to these different experiments has produced nonthermonuclear fusion neutrons.

His theory maintains that in a plasma (matter in a gaseous state where nuclear particles are in ionized form) the Coulomb barrier which separates the deuterons (deuterium nuclei) vary according to the number of electrons present and the speed of the deuterons. In certain conditions it can diminish to the point of permitting the nuclei to fuse. Michel Rambaut calculated that the greater the energy of the deuterium nuclei the higher the rate of nuclear reactions. "The only valid scientific argument against this that was presented to me was that no one has ever seen 2,000 electrons around deuterium nuclei. My answer is that I am waiting for someone to prove that to me," Michel Rambaut maintains.

This theoretical hypothesis leads to several practical consequences.

1. This phenomenon is not dependent on palladium, the same result can be achieved with titanium and nickel. Baraboshkin's Russian team (Yekaterinburg) verified this in June 1992 using bronzes (metalloid crystals).

2. At Pons and Fleischmann's energy level, the reaction is marginal. This awkward experimental situation explains, among other things, why it is difficult to reproduce.
3. All models of the Pons-Fleischmann type, using a substratum (palladium, nickel, titanium, bronze), present a problem—the substratum is quickly used up.
4. The same type of reaction is possible (as in the case of Lochte-Holtgreven) with no substratum. It is no longer the atomic particles [maillies] of the palladium which modifies the electronic environment of the deuterium nuclei, it is high-tension electrical discharges. The method consists of filling a capillary tube with deuterium and connecting the tube to an electrical circuit. A condenser emits electric discharges regulated by a sophisticated switch (operating on the scale of microseconds).

That is the Serbian experiment.

Stunning Imprecision

The preliminary article describing this experiment, due to appear in the next issue of PHYSICS LETTER A, is unsatisfactory. The team at the Belgrade Physics Institute, led by Professor Maric, shows a very serious experimental approach. A glass capillary tube (22 mm long, 1 mm in diameter, is the appropriate size) contains liquid deuterium. A bank of condensers supplies high tension (40,000 volts). The circuit is equipped with a suitable switch and an excellent quality oscilloscope (Tektronik 2440). The data are numerically coded.

Two types of scintillators (the Nuclear Enterprise 323, of British manufacture, and the NZ 213) measure the neutrons. The results, by contrast, are of stunning imprecision. The Serbian team says it can produce 10 to the power of 3 neutrons by pulsation. "This figure is lower than expected," Michel Rambaut observes, puzzled. Not only that, it is lower than heard, since Professor Maric told another French scientist by telephone that, having obtained fluxes of 10 to the power of 12 neutrons, he was forced—in a classical nuclear move—to build a pool around his system to absorb the neutrons.

The discrepancy in the Belgrade results suggests that the realization of the "poor man's atom bomb" will not come next week. It is equally far from being proved that "cold fusion" is likely to replace contemporary nuclear fission. But maybe it would be useful for the skepticism of traditional physicists to be based henceforth on a scientific experiment rather than on a priori assumptions. Particularly in France, where, strangely, the CEA banned experiments in cold fusion in November 1991.

Physics Institute Denies Report

AU0806135693 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
8 Jun 93 p 3

[Article by S. Stojiljkovic: "Neither a Bomb Nor 'Cold Fusion'"]

[Text] Unlike our colleagues from the French daily LE FIGARO, who published an incomplete item, we have the chance to give our own and foreign readers the first information connected to the alleged nuclear weapons in Serbia.

Miroslav Kopecki, director of the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Science, who was the first person we turned to, told us that neither the former nor the present Yugoslavia ever entertained the idea of building an atomic bomb.

"I would like to know how we are supposed to hide even a single gram of radioactive material when every month we have experts visiting from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, who examine and check everything closely," explains Miroslav Kopecki. "Both of our reactors are under their supervision, and they are otherwise not in use. Earlier they would come by biannually, but since we have become a high risk country they come every month."

He comments on the sensational writing of the French daily and compares it to conquering the moon on foot. A few years ago, and when this was the trend in other parts of the world as well, Vinca very loudly announced that they had discovered so-called "cold fusion" (Dr. Vujo Miljevic), but it soon became clear that they had made a mistake.

Our search led us to the Physics Institute in Zemun [near Belgrade], which is actually the only place that experiments with "cold fusion." Academy-member Zvonko Maric, who manages the research, explains that in a certain sense, this is a modified repetition of earlier experiments in Kiel and Uppsala, which is electrical discharge through deuterized matter (full of deuterium). When deuterons collide, fusion occurs. This has no connection with the said "cold fusion."

"We conducted these experiments towards the end of last and the beginning of this year, and we did not keep them a secret from anybody. Moreover, we announced the first results at the international conference in London—which I did not attend owing to the attitude toward my country—but a French colleague read our report," stresses Zvonko Maric. "The conference took place in April. This report should soon be published by the prestigious scientific publication PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS."

The esteemed academy member and our leading physicist comments on LE FIGARO's story and says that this is "an extremely stretched sensation that is supposed to harm Serbia." He invites anyone who wishes to do so to come to the Physics Institute in Zemun and observe the experiment, which may we say, is conducted under meager conditions and without a dinar of state aid.

Marko Popovic, the director of the institute, says that the French text is utter nonsense.

"In order to carry out the experiment implied by the French paper, you need to have a million times more money than we have at our disposal," says Marko Popovic. "We have no secrets here, and we are one of some 20 research teams in the world working on this. May my opinion—that the lucky person or team that finds a theoretical and practical solution will immediately be awarded the Nobel Prize—testify to what a monumental job for science this is."

Further on Denial

*LD0806121793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1043 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—Experts of the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, the only one of its kind in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have never worked on the production of a nuclear bomb nor any other nuclear weapon, Vinca assistant director Branko Djuric told TANJUG today.

Commenting on a sensational article published in the French newspaper FIGARO which says that a nuclear bomb is being made in Yugoslavia, Djuric said that Vinca only worked on a project of development of nuclear energetics, i.e., the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

This type of research was progressing fast until the end of the sixties when it was reduced because of the lack of money and an insufficient interest in this form of energy. Vinca is currently conducting this type of research on a small scale, Djuric said.

In addition, our country is a signatory to the international treaty on nuclear nonproliferation, which means that the Vienna-based International Agency for Nuclear Energy supervises all substances that could be used for the production of nuclear explosive.

In accordance with that treaty, inspectors of the Agency once a month come to our institute for inspection, and this is yet another proof, as Djuric said, that the allegations about the work on nuclear bomb are only searching for a sensation.

Commenting on the FIGARO article claiming that Vinca is carrying out experiments with cold-fusion Djuric said that it was not true. Cold-fusion experiments were conducted elsewhere in the world approximately four years ago but proved unsuccessful and the idea has largely been abandoned. According to Djuric, Vinca has also carried out cold-fusion experiments, which is a considerably simpler way of producing energy, but no reliable progress was reached; therefore, the experiments practically ceased.

INDIA

N-Program Said in 'Dark Phase' Due To Western Embargo*BK0906163293 Hong Kong AFP in English 1324 GMT 9 Jun 93*

[Text] New Delhi, June 9 (AFP)—India's nuclear programme is passing through a "dark phase" because of the embargo clamped on exports of various equipment by the United States and Europe, a nuclear scientist said Wednesday.

Indian purchases of crucial items required for nuclear research have been hit by the embargo imposed after the Gulf war, the PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) quoted A.N. Prasad, director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), as saying in Bombay.

"The embargo by the international weapons community is one of the steps in their stepping up of intrusive inspection capabilities as they do not trust even NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] signatories after the experience with Iran and Iraq," Prasad said.

India, which exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but claims to be pursuing a peaceful atomic programme, refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) calling it discriminatory.

IRAN

Nateq-Nuri Says Nuclear Energy Used for Peaceful Purposes*LD0806160693 Tehran IRNA in English 1443 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Text] Tehran, June 8, IRNA—Majlis speaker Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri said here Tuesday that Iran has repeatedly made it clear that nuclear energy centers in Iran are used for medical, energy and industrial purposes.

The speaker who inspected various sections of the Atomic Energy Organization (AEO), added that international organizations have confirmed Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy following their inspection of these centers.

He further added that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been treated fairly in this respect because in centers such as the AEO research projects are carried out for the benefit of human beings and saving their lives. However, the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran have accused Iran of using nuclear energy for the destruction of mankind.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Nateq-Nuri said that enormous projects are being carried out in the AEO.

He also added that the Islamic Republic of Iran who faces many enemies is one of the most stable countries of the region and the world. "This is a source of pride for the officials and the nation," he added.

ISRAEL

Intelligence Branch Head on Far East Weapons Threat*TA0806071793 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 0500 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Text] China has already supplied research nuclear reactors to the Middle East. This was said by Major General Uri Sagi, head of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Intelligence Branch. Maj. Gen. Sagi said that this necessitates close monitoring by Israeli intelligence, because the potential sale of nuclear weapons to Arab states from the Far East poses a very great danger. Our military affairs correspondent Netan'el Semrik reports:

[Begin recording] [Semrik] The threat of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the ways of foiling it is one of the main issues under the constant scrutiny of intelligence elements in Israel and abroad. Maj. Gen. Sagi warns of the danger inherent in the infiltration of know-how as well as conventional and nuclear weapons from the Far East to our region. He said that North Korea is a country with an independent policy of aggressive weapons marketing:

[Sagi] To date North Korea has considered itself unfettered by the West's policy. The Scud-C missiles come from there; they also supply the No Dong missiles to Iran. I think that this poses a great potential danger, and we will have to monitor this situation very carefully. You mentioned two important points; the most alarming issue, however, is that of the Far East countries.

[Semrik] Referring to the developing Chinese power, Maj. Gen. Sagi said it has curtailed the supply of surface-to-surface missiles to the Middle East in the wake of the U.S. appeal in this issue:

[Sagi] China is selling other kinds of weapons. It is also selling research nuclear reactors to our region. It has an independent policy concerning this issue. China is sufficiently sensitive, however, to international or Western public opinion, and I believe that the United States is able to moderate Chinese policy in these spheres somewhat.

[Semrik] Regarding the splinters of the former USSR—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, Sagi says they have so far evinced a responsible policy in terms of preserving the nuclear know-how and weapons in their possession.

Sarid: No More Nuclear Reactors To Be Built

*TA0506102893 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
0900 GMT 5 Jun 93*

[Text] The Environment Ministry will not allow the construction of nuclear reactors in Israel, in addition to those operating at the moment, as long as a new generation of foolproof nuclear reactors is not developed, Minister Yosi Sarid stated in an interview. He emphasized that efforts are currently under way in Germany and France to develop foolproof nuclear reactors, but their development will not be completed any time soon.

Our correspondent Shula Schmerling points out that the meaning of this announcement is that the Environment Ministry will not allow the construction of the nuclear power station which Israel Electricity Company wants to build at the Shivta site in the Negev.

PAKISTAN

Minister: Steps Taken To Deter Indian Missile Threat

*BK0806092693 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Overseas
Service in English 0800 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Text] The defense minister, Syed Ghaus Ali Shah, assured the National Assembly today that the government is fully conscious of the development and installation of Prithvi [surface-to-surface] missiles by India and necessary steps have been taken to meet the challenge. He was speaking on a call-attention notice by MNA's [members of National Assembly]—Haji Javed Iqbal Cheema, Mr. Gul Hamid Khan Rokri, and Mian Mohammad Yasin Khan Wattoo—regarding installation of such dangerous missiles by India on our borders, raising concern among the people.

The defense minister said Prithvi missile which has a range of 200 to 3000 km is presently in a testing stage. However, he said there is a possibility that India might have deployed a prototype version of the missile. He said the government is closely watching the situation and our defense forces can meet any challenge from any quarter.

RUSSIA

U.S. N-Arms Initiative Said To Have 'Angered' Moscow*PM0906143593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Jun 93 First Edition p 3*

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "Washington's Initiative on Nuclear Weapons Interested Kiev But Angered Moscow"]

[Text] The Ukrainian leadership has expressed an interest in the U.S. proposal for settling the problem of the 176 strategic nuclear missiles left on the republic's territory following the breakup of the USSR. U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin expounded it during his visit to Kiev.

The crux of the U.S. idea is that the missiles must be dismantled and stored temporarily on Ukrainian territory. At the same time they will be under direct international control. Subsequently—and Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov appears to agree with this—it is proposed to send the charges to Russia to extract the plutonium from them.

This could reduce the tension between the two largest republics of the former Soviet Union, removing fears about the possible use of the missiles by one of them.

The United States has not granted Ukraine the additional security guarantees on which Kiev is insisting. But the intermediary mission undertaken by Washington is designed to convince the Ukrainian leaders that they have a "great friend" and that they can abandon the warheads without sacrificing security.

Washington has backed up its hint with proposals to expand military contacts between the two states and to give assistance in building Ukraine's armed forces. Kiev's demand for an increase in the amounts of compensation (Washington has allocated \$175 million for nuclear disarmament) will be studied.

Thus, Kiev has been given to understand that a compromise is possible on almost all the points of the conditions for nuclear disarmament laid down by Ukraine. This has enabled Aspin to take with him to Washington President Leonid Kravchuk's assurance that parliament will approve the republic's nonnuclear status within a month.

But Washington's concessions have elicited a harsh reaction from Moscow. On the eve of his visit to Kiev Aspin met in the FRG with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who rejected the idea of storing the missiles on Ukrainian territory. Moscow insists that the weapons be handed over to Russia, which is recognized as the sole heir to the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Grachev declared that Washington's version virtually preserves Ukraine's nuclear status and could prompt Kazakhstan

and, maybe, Belarus to renounce their adopted pledges to hand over to Russia for destruction the weapons they have ended up with.

Despite Grachev's objections, Aspin did not abandon his initiative (the talks will be continued in July, when Defense Minister Morozov arrives in the United States), evidently reckoning on changing Moscow's position during the Russian minister's return visit to the United States.

Deputy Minister Views INF Anniversary*PM0406130593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 4 Jun 93 p 7*

[Article by Russian Federation Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov: "First Step Away from Nuclear Confrontation"]

[Excerpts] The fifth anniversary of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF) fell on 1 June 1993. Although five years are not a very long time they have seen profound historical changes which have taken place primarily in our country. That is why there are grounds for returning to assessments of the treaty and examining the experience and results of its implementation from present-day positions.

I think that it may now be asserted with even more justification than before that this treaty marked a qualitatively new stage in the disarmament process. Whereas in previous agreements there was talk of curbing the nuclear arms race, the INF Treaty made the first real step in the field of nuclear disarmament. The sides pledged to eliminate their existing intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missile facilities and to ban the production and testing of these facilities. Together with the missiles their launchers and connected support structures and support equipment were subject to elimination, as were deployment areas, missile operation bases, and missile support facilities.

By 1 June 1991 the process of the elimination of missile facilities with a range of 500 to 5,500 km coming under the treaty had been completely ended in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the treaty. [passage omitted]

It should be noted that right now the process of the treaty's implementation—by virtue of well-known historical events—has undergone some changes. Thus, the withdrawal of the Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—from the USSR in the fall of 1991 required determining the manner in which the fulfillment of the treaty on their territory would be ensured. In particular it was a case of how to ensure U.S. inspection activity at the seven facilities in these countries coming under the treaty. Proposals to hold talks on this question, which initially came from the USSR Foreign Ministry and then from the Russian Foreign Ministry failed to meet with

support from the Baltic states' foreign policy departments. At a briefing in Minsk 24 February this year the U.S. side, notified of this approach on the part of our Baltic neighbors, made a statement to the effect that the United States does not regard the Baltic states as the USSR's legal heirs and will not seek to carry out inspections on their territories in the future.

Considering the United States' stated position, Russia also has the right to consider itself exempted from duties with regard to ensuring U.S. inspections in the Baltic states in accordance with the treaty. At the same time, recognizing that these states are not the USSR's legal heirs, I should like to note that their territory previously, as part of the territory of the Union, was covered by the treaty and the commitments envisaged by the treaty extended to that territory. Therefore, in the interests of preserving stability and predictability in the development of the situation it would be important for the Baltic states' governments to come out with political statements to the effect that these states, while not the legal heirs of the USSR as regards the INF Treaty, nonetheless undertake not to produce intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missile facilities or have them on their territory. I think such statements would be welcomed with satisfaction by the world community and particularly by these Baltic countries' neighbors and would only strengthen the international authority of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

Various questions of the treaty's further fulfillment also arose as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the formation of 12 independent states on its territory. In that context fundamental importance attached to the 6 July 1992 memorandum of understanding on the question of succession of rights regarding the treaties of the former USSR of mutual interest and the 9 October 1992 decision on the participation of CIS states in the INF Treaty—documents signed at summit level. In turn, considering the new situation, the U.S. Government has determined its position whereby the heirs to the USSR as regards the INF Treaty are all 12 states formed on its territory and the participation of six of them (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine) in the treaty's practical implementation is essential since facilities coming under the treaty and consequently liable to U.S. inspections are only on their territory.

Recently there have been two meetings in Minsk of representatives of CIS states and the United States and there have been other contacts through diplomatic channels as a result of which work is close to completion on a number of documents which, after they have been signed while retaining the treaty in the form in which it was signed and ratified, would make it possible to fulfill it on a new multilateral basis. The point is that in Russia there already exists the "infrastructure" necessary for the treaty's practical implementation and now it is a case of opening up the entry points for U.S. inspection groups in other CIS states and of establishing communications lines between them and the United States. It is also

essential to determine the procedure for the further inspection on a multilateral basis of U.S. facilities subject to the treaty.

During the fulfillment of the INF Treaty at some facilities subject to inspection the situation has changed radically: They have not only lost their link with nuclear missile facilities but have ceased to exist at all as military establishments and have become entirely civilian. One of the first such civilian establishments was the only Soviet missile operation base for OTR-22 missiles on Czech soil in Hranice, which was handed over to the civilian sector even before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSFR. A number of similar establishments on the territory of the former GDR have also been handed over to the civilian sector and, moreover, as a result of Germany's unification have found themselves on the territory of the FRG, that is a state linked to the United States by ally relations. The U.S. side was once faced with the question of halting U.S. inspection activity at these facilities but at the time there was not positive response from it. I think that with a consideration for the accumulated experience in implementing the treaty and the altered international situation we should think whether it is expedient at all to inspect facilities which have ceased to be military facilities and are used exclusively for civilian purposes. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin: Russia To Work for 'Nuclear-Free North Korea'

*SK0906024093 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
9 Jun 93 p 1*

[By correspondent Pak Tu-sik from Moscow]

[Excerpts] Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu, while on a visit to Russia, paid President Yeltsin a courtesy call on the morning of 8 June in the Kremlin and conveyed to him a personal letter from President Kim Yong-sam asking for Russia's continued cooperation in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

President Yeltsin expressed his thanks and conveyed to the foreign minister an official letter inviting President Kim Yong-sam to visit Russia. He said he hoped President Kim would visit Russia in the near future.

To this, Foreign Minister Han said that "we cannot rule out the possibility of President Kim visiting Russia within this year." Thus, hinting at the possibility of initiating early diplomatic negotiations for President Kim to visit Russia.[passage omitted]

President Yeltsin said that "Russia stopped providing nuclear technologies to North Korea a long time ago" [imi oraejonbuto pukhane taehan haekkisul chiwonul chundanhaewatta] and vowed that "Russia will make efforts for a nuclear-free North Korea" [haekmugi opnun pukhani toedorok noryok hagetta].

He then said that "Russia will encourage the functions [kinungul changryo] of the International Atomic Energy

Agency [IAEA] so that the IAEA can keep its watch [kamsi] over North Korea's nuclear development."

Noting that "many issues need to be resolved in the future in order to resolve the issue of North Korea's withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty," Foreign Minister Han asked that Russia continue to cooperate and make joint efforts for this.

In connection with the multilateral security system [taja anbochegye] in Northeast Asia, Minister Han said that "we welcome Russia's participation in the multilateral cooperation [hyopryok] system in Northeast Asia which we are now pursuing." [passage omitted]

Russian Sale of Weapons Plutonium Reported

*PM0806160093 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 6 Jun 93 p 7*

[Sune Olofson report: "Russians Want To Sell Plutonium From Scrapped Missiles"]

[Text] Lulea—"Our plutonium from the nuclear arms which are to be dismantled is a national resource for Russia and worth several times more than gold. It is for sale. For the time being, in collaboration with the United States, we will keep it in 40,000 containers," nuclear physicist Lev Feoktistov, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said. He has worked for 27 years in Russia on the development of nuclear arms.

Together with American and Russian researchers he is visiting Lulea where he is lecturing at a conference which finishes today and has been arranged by Swedish doctors opposed to nuclear arms. The aim of the conference is to exert pressure on the superpowers for an extension of the nuclear test ban treaty.

"Plutonium and uranium are not particularly dangerous when they are handled correctly," said Lev Feoktistov, who actually shrugged his shoulder when asked about Russia's moral responsibility in the face of the risk of proliferation.

In the summer of 1991 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the first START agreement which meant that U.S. strategic nuclear warheads were to be cut from 12,600 to around 8,500 and the Soviet Union's from 11,100 to just over 6,000. On 3 January 1992 START II was signed and a further step was taken. By the year 2003 U.S. warheads will have been cut to 3,500 and Russian warheads to 3,000. In addition intercontinental ballistic missiles which each carry several warheads will be abolished.

The weapons systems which could destroy all life on earth will—when Ukraine hopefully ratifies START I and signs the nonproliferation agreement—be dismantled.

But so far not a single nuclear warhead has been destroyed. Only missiles have been rendered harmless through the removal of their warheads. At least two questions remain: What will the United States and Russia do with the plutonium which is left after dismantling? Is it at all possible to destroy plutonium?

Doctor Georgiy A. Kaurov, spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, said that Russian nuclear technicians have designed and constructed a special container for the storage of uranium and plutonium.

"There is no suggestion of destroying the plutonium left when the warheads are dismantled. Instead we have reached an agreement on temporary storage in 40,000 Russian-designed containers which will be manufactured in the United States over the next four years. The first 200 containers will be delivered from the United States at the end of the year," Georgiy Kaurov said.

According to Kaurov, it has been decided that the containers will be stored in bunkers in two locations that have yet to be chosen. There has been speculation that the bunkers will be located in salt mines and underground chambers, but according to Kaurov the question has not yet been successfully resolved. For the time being the containers will be stored at well guarded military bases.

"Storage is an extremely serious question for us. I see no reason for the citizens of the world to have fears about our handling of plutonium and uranium," Kaurov said. What else would he say?

Hans Blix, who is head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, has declared that the IAEA is prepared to monitor storage, but then a great deal more money would be needed from member nations.

According to experts, if all the world's nuclear arms were to be dismantled today, around 260 tonnes of plutonium would remain and would have to be dealt with. A medium-sized nuclear bomb needs 3 to 5 kilos of plutonium. Therefore 260 tonnes produces around 52,000 bombs.

"Impoverished Russia cannot afford to throw away its plutonium. We are counting on the possibility of selling it on the world market at a price considerably higher than that of gold. But we are hardly going to sell pure plutonium, but a mix of uranium and plutonium which can be used as nuclear fuel," said Lev Feoktistov, who also admitted that the plutonium 239 in the mix could be extracted and used for nuclear arms.[passage omitted]

START Ratification Debate Deferment Urged

PM0906115193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jun 93 p 7

[Article by Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Kozlov, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, president of the Russian Association of Independent Military Scientists: "If You Weigh Things Up"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet has started discussing the question of the ratification of the START II treaty. This procedure requires an extremely considered approach based primarily on expert assessments and research and development by specialists in various fields. It would be sad if the discussion was to be reduced to just another political confrontation between supporters and opponents of the president's policy, between "democrats" and "conservatives."

The difficulty of the situation associated with the ratification of the treaty boils down to two factors. First, the Supreme Soviet, unlike state structures, has virtually no qualified organizations or collectives of academics and practical specialists capable of formulating reliable and objective recommendations on this problem. The Defense and Foreign Ministries' participation in the

preparation of the treaty rules out the possibility of involving these departments' institutes since their answer would be unambiguous—the SALT II treaty must be ratified. Second, the overwhelming majority of Supreme Soviet members are unable for perfectly understandable reasons (past experience, specialization) to work out all the treaty's largely technical subtleties. The corollary of this is a growing probability of them "drifting" toward attitudes of personal sympathy or antipathy toward a given set of politicians.

In my view, the way out is to involve academics and specialists from the independent scientific and science-and-production centers, associations, and other "think tanks" which have emerged in Russia in recent years. This is not a new idea in principle and has long been utilized abroad.

Assessments "for" and "against" the ratification of START II obtained by one such independent organization—the Russian Association of Independent Military Scientists—are presented in this article.

The table shows what we regard as the five most important factors which it is expedient to take into account when deciding the question of ratifying the treaty. It also includes the results of expert assessments (* sign).

| No. | Factors | Results of Expert Assessments | | |
|-----|--|-------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | | For | Against | Unclear |
| 1. | Panhuman | * | | |
| 2. | Military-Strategic Security of Russian Federation: | | | |
| | —treaty's correspondence to Russian Federation military doctrine | | * | |
| | —parity with the United States | | | * |
| | —mutual relations with other nuclear powers: | | | |
| | Britain and France | * | | |
| | China | | * | |
| | Belarus and Kazakhstan | * | | |
| | Ukraine | | | * |
| | —mutual relations with states which have not signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons but are capable of developing them | | | * |
| 3. | Ecological Consequences of Nuclear Conflict: | | | |
| | —regional and local | * | | |
| | —"nuclear winter" | | | * |
| | —destruction of Earth's ozone layer | | | * |
| | —consequences of explosions in near-Earth space | | | * |
| 4. | Economic: | | | |
| | —recycling or destruction of rockets and nuclear weapons | * | | |
| | —future development of Russian Federation Armed Forces, including strategic forces | | | * |
| 5. | Social | * | | |

We offer brief explanations for your attention.

The attractiveness of the first factor is obvious. Mankind must live without nuclear weapons, and therefore any movement in this direction should be welcomed. But the realities of the present-day world are such that, despite an appreciable reduction in the level of military confrontation, a nuclear-free world remains an extremely remote and as yet unattainable objective. That is, the "panhuman" factor cannot be the determining factor in terms of the ratification of START II.

Russia's military-strategic security, however, is one of the most important assessments. It requires the examination of many questions, primarily the treaty's correspondence to our country's military doctrine. Unfortunately this doctrine has not yet been elaborated. The conclusion from this is that ratification of START II is undesirable. The truth that the military doctrine is paramount and everything else, including the treaty under discussion, is secondary, needs no proof. The doctrine can be made to fit the treaty, of course, but that approach would mean an increase in the probability that objective political, military, and economic interests of the Russian Federation would be left out of account.

Other questions determining military-strategic security are linked with military doctrine to a greater or lesser extent, although they also have a certain significance in themselves. Many of them relate to controversial questions. For example, the problem of military parity with the United States. If the military doctrine is not going to make provision for such parity, naturally the treaty must be ratified. Possibly a more optimal option in this instance would be to reduce our country's nuclear potential to the level of Britain, France, or China. Otherwise it becomes more difficult to assess parity because of the work on antimissile defense being done in the United States and the total uncertainty about Russia's ability to halt this work by political methods. You do not need to be an expert to realize that any reduction in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and a transition to single-warhead missiles makes antimissile defense tasks easier and reduces the cost of developing such defenses.

We have touched on only one important aspect of military parity with the United States. Taking into account the fact that the problem has a whole number of other equally important aspects (comparative analysis of the "nuclear triads," assessment of the possibility of carrying out a retaliatory counterstrike or retaliatory strike, assessment of the possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage on a probable enemy in a retaliatory strike, and so forth), it is obvious that this factor alone can give rise to many contradictory judgments preventing the Supreme Soviet from drawing unequivocal conclusions about ratification of the treaty.

Let us draw particular attention to the "Chinese factor." Its continuation of underground test, its proximity to Russia, and the absence of reliable data on this neighboring country's nuclear missile potential argue more

against ratification of the treaty. We should also include among the unclear issues our mutual relations with states capable of developing nuclear weapons: because of proximity to Russia's borders, the instability of the political situation and the odiousness of the regimes in a number of these states, and the possibility of nuclear blackmail and terrorist acts. Russia has no precise and clear military-political views about a possible challenge from this group of countries.

Extremely frequently various experts employ the concept of "inflicting unacceptable damage on a probable enemy." This concept has serious defects because of its vagueness resulting from the nonexistence of scientifically substantiated criteria for such damage. There is always a need for additional remarks explaining what in the final analysis is meant by such damage: the loss of one or several major cities, the destruction of one or several hydroelectric power station dams, the destruction of nuclear power stations (how many?), or maybe putting air force or naval bases out of operation? This is why there is a more comprehensible point in examining the question from the ecological viewpoint.

The crux of this lies in the following fundamental consideration: the result of reducing nuclear missile potential must be to rule out devastating ecological consequences in the event of nuclear war. Only in such a situation will politicians not be tempted to reach for the nuclear "button" in an international crisis caused by a conflict of states' political, economic, or other interests.

But the problem of reliably assessing the ecological consequences of a nuclear conflict, particularly consequences of a global nature, has not been solved. Earlier studies were marred by excessive ideological and political influences. Moreover, the physical models on which assessments were based do not withstand serious criticism. In other words, the possibility of a nuclear conflict being unleashed at this time is low, but it does exist.

From the economic viewpoint the greatest significance is assessing financial expenditure on the future development of our armed forces, including our strategic forces, if START II is ratified. This question is also linked with Russia's military doctrine.

The economic benefit from reducing the country's nuclear missile forces is indisputable, even given the need for certain expenditure on the component-recycling and destruction of arms subject to reduction. According to some estimates, this benefit will total something like 100 billion rubles. But it could be reduced to nothing if the development of the armed forces requires the development [sozdaniye] of a new generation of strategic systems and the intensive development [razvitiye] of sea-launched nuclear missile systems, where the United States has supremacy.

The social factor covers an entire set of questions linked with the reduction of Russian army manpower and the conversion of the military-industrial complex. They

have been repeatedly discussed in the press. But ratification of the treaty must not be dependent on getting these questions "sorted out."

Let us sum up the results of this brief analysis. It is not difficult to see that it is not possible to give the Supreme Soviet unequivocal recommendations. There are objective and weighty arguments "for" and "against" ratification.

Many problems require further serious discussion. Therefore the most sensible and correct thing would be for the Supreme Soviet to defer examining the question of ratification of the treaty at least until Russia's military doctrine has been adopted, attitudes to American work on antimissile defense have been clearly defined, and a comprehensive program for the development of the armed forces has been elaborated. To reject the treaty as a whole or make fundamental changes to the text is inadvisable at the present stage.

Scientist, Aide on Fate of Weapons Plutonium

*PM0806160093 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 6 Jun 93 p 7*

[Sune Olofson report: "Russians Want To Sell Plutonium From Scrapped Missiles"]

[Text] Lulea—"Our plutonium from the nuclear arms which are to be dismantled is a national resource for Russia and worth several times more than gold. It is for sale. For the time being, in collaboration with the United States, we will keep it in 40,000 containers," nuclear physicist Lev Feoktistov, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said. He has worked for 27 years in Russia on the development of nuclear arms.

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According to Kaurov, it has been decided that the containers will be stored in bunkers in two locations that have yet to be chosen. There has been speculation that the bunkers will be located in salt mines and underground chambers, but according to Kaurov the question has not yet been successfully resolved. For the time being the containers will be stored at well guarded military bases.

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Nuclear Factory Ceases Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production*LD0706090693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0500 GMT 7 Jun 93*

[Report by Sergey Sergeyev from Chelyabinsk; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Mayak Production Association was the first-born of the Russian nuclear industry. Until recently this enterprise's main product was weapons-grade plutonium, the principal component of nuclear weapons. Now, however, the reactors working for defense purposes have been shut down; instead of the filling for atomic bombs, the enterprise is now making things which are needed by the national economy, scientific research and medicine, such as sources of radio-isotope radiation. This enterprise in the Urals is supplying isotopes not only to all the regions of Russia and the states of the CIS, but to over 40 other countries worldwide. Now, having only just taken its first steps in the international marketplace, this defense enterprise, which was top secret until two to three years ago, has already gained an award from the European Society of Goods Producers in Madrid. [video shows interior and exterior views of a nuclear factory]

Country Supports 'Positive' Solutions to Ukraine Nuke Issue*LD0806134193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1302 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Staroselskiy and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow June 8 TASS—"Many ideas are appearing today, intended to break the deadlock over the fulfilment of the Lisbon agreements, primarily by Kiev. All these proposals reflect the anxiety of the international community," head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department Sergey Yastrzhembskiy told a briefing here today. He was replying to the question of how the Russian Foreign Ministry assessed the idea of storing dismantled nuclear warheads on the territory of Ukraine under U.N. control until they are destroyed, suggested during the meeting of Ukrainian and U.S. defence ministers in Kiev on Monday.

"We are ready to back any proposal, intended to break the deadlock over this problem, affecting the national interests of Ukraine, which we, of course, take into consideration," Yastrzhembskiy stated. "Any positive solutions will be supported, if they help fulfil the Lisbon agreements," he added.

"The key requirements of these agreements," Yastrzhembskiy recalled, "are to ratify the START-1 Treaty and Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state."

Control of Weapons-Grade Materials Exports To Be Widened*MK0506102493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 5 Jun 93 p 2*

[Konstantin Smirnov report: "Conference on Export Control. CIS Intends To Control Export of 'Dangerous' Technologies"]

[Text] The Russian Foreign Ministry has proceeded with practical steps to create within the CIS a system of control for the export of materials and technologies used in the production of the weapons of mass destruction. Yesterday, the first conference on the subject attended by representatives of the CIS countries ended in Moscow. KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts note that in Russia there is no shortage of agencies willing to take the process of setting up export control in the CIS under their wing, just as there is a lack of proper control over the export of raw and other materials used in the production of the weapons of mass destruction in the CIS outside Russia.

At present, Russia alone exercises control over the export of raw materials, equipment, technologies, and services that may be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. This has been done on the basis of special control lists compiled by the Russian Government's Commission for Export Control in April 1992.

As for CIS-wide decisions, the situation so far has been such that real control is nonexistent, but the number of agencies willing to organize it is growing. On 26 June 1992 the heads of the Commonwealth signed an agreement on coordinating efforts on the matters of the export of dual-purpose materials and technologies. The chiefs of the CIS countries' Foreign Economic Relations Ministries approved in Almaty on 31 May 1993 the agreement on setting up the CIS Export Control Council to be headed by the chief of the Russian export control commission (see KOMMERSANT-DAILY of 2 June).

Now the Russian Foreign Ministry, having remembered that it should "supervise" disarmament-related problems, joined the effort to set up such a council. From 3 to 4 June, the first conference of Foreign Ministries and other interested agencies of the countries-parties to the Agreement on Multilateral Export Control took place. The Russian delegation handed the chiefs of Armenian, Belarusian, Kazakhstani, Tajikistani, and Ukrainian delegations the control lists of materials, export, technologies, and also documents regulating the procedure for their utilization in Russia. The Russian side expects to receive an answer by the end of the year at the next conference, which is scheduled to take place in Minsk. As a result, the creation of a CIS-style Cocom is proceeding along a number of routes at one time—via the CIS Council for Multilateral Export Control, the Council of Chiefs of CIS Foreign Economic Relations Ministries, and regular (held at least twice a year) conferences sponsored by the CIS Foreign Ministries.

[Article includes the following boxed passage]

Decisions of the export control conference of CIS countries

- To bring national export control systems in line with existing international regimes;
- To complete the work on creating operating national export control systems in CIS countries;
- To hold at least twice a year regular conferences of CIS countries' representatives on matters related to control over the export of raw and other materials, export, technologies, and services, which may be used for the creation of the weapons of mass destruction;
- In the period leading up to the next conference, scheduled for the end of the year in Minsk, representatives of the Republic of Belarus will act as coordinators of the organization of national export control systems within the CIS.

Mayak Plutonium Plant Diversifies Into Civilian Output

PM0706143593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2000 GMT 2 Jun 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Video report from Che-lyabinsk Oblast by S. Sergeyev and V. Otryvanov, identified by caption]

[Excerpt] [Sergeyev] [Video opens with view of plant exterior] The "Mayak" Production Association is the Russian nuclear industry's first-born. Until recently this enterprise's main output was weapon-grade plutonium, the basic component of nuclear weapons. But now the reactors once employed in the defense sector have stopped, and, instead of the filling for nuclear bombs, everything necessary for the national economy, scientific research, and the medical sector is being produced here—for instance, radioisotope radiation sources [istochniki radioizotopnogo izlucheniya]. These Ural workers supply isotopes not only to all regions of Russia and the CIS states, but also to over 40 other countries of the world. And having taken its first tentative steps in the international market, this defense enterprise, which only two or three years ago was top secret, has already won an award from the European Producers' Society in Madrid. [passage omitted]

BELARUS

Kozlovskiy Says Arms Reduction Commitments Being Fulfilled

LD0206134993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1328 GMT 2 Jun 93

[By unidentified BELINFORM-TASS correspondent]

[Excerpt] Minsk June 2 TASS—"Belarus is scrupulously fulfilling the assumed arms reduction commitments,"

Belarus Defence Minister Colonel-General Pavel Kozlovskiy told the newspaper "ZVYAZDA". "Shortage of means to destroy tanks and armoured carriers, which are to be scrapped under these agreements, is a serious problem," he added.

The minister said that the American side had promised 74 million U.S. dollars mainly for the nuclear safety programme. Nevertheless, not all the weaponry is slated for destruction. Some of it will be sold in accordance with the rules fixed by the United Nations.

Asked whether Belarus troops would be sent to Yugoslavia to serve in the U.N. peacekeeping forces there, the minister said that such a step could be taken only with the consent of the Belarus Parliament. He believes the republic should not be involved in any inter-ethnic conflicts. However, he could not fully rule out the participation of Belarus servicemen in some conflicts. "But every such case should be authorised by the republic's parliament," Kozlovsky said. [passage omitted]

Government Pledges Withholding First Use of Nuclear Weapons

LD1006163593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1553 GMT 10 Jun 93

[By BELINFORM for TASS]

[Text] Minsk June 10 TASS—The Belarusian Parliament ratified on Thursday the "agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons" which was signed by four nuclear former Soviet republics in Almaty on December 21.

According to the document, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine confirmed their commitment to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons. Until the complete elimination of former Soviet nuclear arsenal on the Belarusian and Ukrainian territories the decision on the use of the weapons is to be agreed with parties to the agreement.

The BELINFORM News Agency said that by ratification of the agreement by Belarus confirmed its adherence to non-proliferation and the desire to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

UKRAINE

Reportage on Aspin Talks With Ukraine Leaders

Aspin Upbeat on Talks; Nuclear Issue

LD0706161393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1522 GMT 7 Jun 93

[by UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaika]

[Text] Kiev, 7 Jun (TASS)—Speaking at a news conference today, U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin described his visit to Kiev as fruitful and promising. He spoke

highly of the outcome of his meetings with President Leonid Kravchuk and with parliamentarians, his talks with Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, and his conversations in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

We succeeded in reaching an agreement on establishing long-term and broad relations with the Ukrainian military department, Les Aspin noted. First and foremost, working groups which will examine a range of specific measures to implement these agreements will be set up. Other proposals were also discussed, but no specific decisions were adopted. This will probably be done during the Ukrainian defense minister's visit to the United States, the Pentagon leader concluded.

Although the visit was a short one, the head of the Ukrainian military department said, we got through a great deal of fruitful work. A great number of issues, in particular cooperation in the sphere of training military cadres and of military medicine, were examined. Problems of nuclear disarmament and guaranteeing nuclear safety during the whole period of the elimination of these weapons were touched upon. Konstantin Morozov noted the U.S. desire to make a proper study of this problem. "The kindly attitude which the American side has shown toward an understanding of it, just as it has shown to an understanding of the whole range of problems facing the Ukraine," he noted, "is a basis for working out concrete decisions." At the same time, the defense minister again reaffirmed the unchanging nature of the Ukraine's policy of preserving its nuclear-free status. At the same time, he said that nuclear warheads should remain on Ukrainian territory until a final decision is adopted on their destruction.

Official Also Upbeat on Results

LD0806191293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 8 Jun 93

[Report by correspondent Anatoliy Komirenko on 8 June briefing for Ukrainian and foreign journalists given in the Foreign Ministry by Anton Buteyko, head of the international service of the president's administration, and Volodymyr Chornyy, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Latvia, including recorded segments of Buteyko and Chornyy remarks]

[Text] [Komirenko] Mr. Buteyko replied to numerous questions from journalists concerning the recent visit of the U.S. defense secretary to Kiev, the process of parliament ratifying international agreements on nuclear weapons, and on whether the U.S. position toward our state has changed on disarmament issues. Replies to such questions as for example whether Ukraine's declared nonbloc status is going to change, etc, caused especial interest among the journalists.

Dwelling in detail on the results of the visit by the U.S. defense secretary to Ukraine, Anton Buteyko noted that in the course of the talks Ukraine's position was elucidated and further steps of cooperation between the two

states were worked out, including in military affairs. According to Mr. Buteyko, special attention was focused on issues of granting security guarantees to Ukraine. On the U.S. position toward Ukraine he noted:

[Buteyko] In the course of the conversation between the president and the U.S. defense secretary, a wide range of issues linked to further relations between our two states was examined, including the U.S. proposal regarding a mediating role in settling those problems which exist in relations between Ukraine and Russia. We evaluate positively the change in U.S. statements and words, which has now appeared. The United States is expressing through its officials the wish to begin a new stage of multifaceted cooperation, which will be developed as partnership and friendship.

[Komirenko] On the matter of Ukraine's statement on not being part of a bloc, Mr. Buteyko stressed:

[Buteyko] Ukraine is going to be a nonbloc state. This decision has been adopted by parliament, and only parliament can change it. As far as Ukraine not being part of a bloc is concerned, I would like to stress that not being part of a bloc does not at all mean that Ukraine will not cooperate in military issues with any state. We believe that the nonbloc nature of Ukrainian policy has a positive tendency. And naturally you know that Ukraine is taking part in NATO bodies, which makes it possible to cooperate in the political and military-political spheres. Ukraine also cooperates within the framework of the CIS on issues concerning military-technical cooperation.

[Komirenko] In connection with issues of Ukraine's parliament ratifying international agreements on nuclear weapons, the problem of guarantees for Ukraine's security stands out sharply. On this subject the journalists heard the following:

[Buteyko] As you know, Ukraine's position regarding security guarantees is that its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders should be guaranteed. It should be guaranteed that nuclear and conventional weapons will not be used against Ukraine, and that economic pressure will not be used.

[Komirenko] Continuing the tradition which has arisen in Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereby the heads of Ukraine's diplomatic missions abroad meet representatives of the mass media on the eve of their departure to the place where they will fulfill their duties, Volodymyr Chornyy, ambassador of Ukraine to the Republic of Latvia, addressed those present.

[Chornyy] I see my task as three-fold: To establish interstate relations between our two countries on a contractual and legal basis; second, the Ukrainian diaspora views the embassy as a kind of center of political, economic, cultural, and legal support for the Ukrainian population residing in Latvia; and third, my task is somehow to renew—in accordance with my strength and capability—and here and there to create a new base for

developing cultural, economic, and scientific and technical links between our states.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Debates Arms Treaties

*PM0706115993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Jun 93 First Edition p 1*

[Report by Irina Pogodina: "In Ukraine Tension Begins With Parliament"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is holding a hearing of the question of the ratification of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and on accession to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The hearings, repeatedly deferred because parliament was busy with domestic political problems, were now prepared so hastily that the deputies did not even receive the documents under discussion. Nonetheless reports were heard from Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and Vasily Durdinets, leader of the parliamentary commission for preparing treaties for ratification and first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. In addition, in a brief speech Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk touched on the subject of "bloc membership" and also expressed himself in favor of retaining a unified command of the CIS strategic forces instead of handing over the "button" to the Russian commander in chief.

The deputies' questions to the speakers again demonstrated a clear watershed between the views of the so-called "hawks" and "doves." But the economic factor, to wit which is more expensive, the arms race or the possession of nuclear weapons, has not yet been elucidated and in the long term could substantially change today's placement of forces.

But there is still quite a long way to go to the adoption of a decision. Despite the calls from Vasily Durdinets and Anatoliy Zlenko not to delay this process if only for the sake of preserving Ukraine's image, the acceleration of the matter is being prevented not only by the forthcoming work in the commissions, which is problematic at the time of the imminent summer vacation, but also by the split among deputies, which is again growing deeper on "nuclear soil."

Observers note that today this wave of resistance threatens primarily not the ratification of Start I—the almost established unity of parliament in the laborious struggle with the president on the question of the structure of executive power is being skillfully destroyed.

President Comments on Ratification of START I

'Convinced' Parliament To Ratify

*LD0806160793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Text] President Leonid Kravchuk is convinced that the parliament will ratify the START I treaty and will make a decision on Ukraine joining the Lisbon protocol. This was stated in a briefing at Ukraine's Foreign Ministry by Anton Buteyko, head of the president's office for international issues.

The head of the office emphasized that Ukraine is not renouncing its nonaligned status. The decision on this status was passed by the Ukraine parliament and it alone can cancel that decision.

Kiev To Ratify, But Not Quickly

*OW1106172593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1600 GMT 11 Jun 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has "almost no doubt" that the START-1 Treaty will be ratified. However, "one should not hope that we shall do this quickly," he declared on Friday in Kiev at the meeting with the Russian parliamentary delegation headed by the coordinator of the Council of Factions Vladimir Novikov.

It would not be convenient for Ukraine to dismantle nuclear missiles on its territory and to hand over nuclear warheads to Russia as this process threatens great environmental danger. Kravchuk repeated that 36 missiles with liquid-fuelled propulsion systems possessed by Ukraine would work out their service life by the end of this year or the beginning of the next year. "We need to get rid of these missiles," he emphasized.

Speaking about the problem of dual citizenship, Kravchuk noted that "it is high time for both countries to meet and to solve this issue." There is diversity in the opinion of both countries with respect to this issue, but they are not principal ones and primarily concern material and social consequences of its solution.

Regarding the parliamentarians' question what both parliaments can do to improve the Ukrainian-Russian relations, Kravchuk expressed the opinion that "the parliaments must inform each other on problems related to both countries and presented for consideration." Mentioning the issue on the Ukrainian-Russian economic relations, the problem of open borders, and absence of customs offices, Kravchuk said that he does

not support the idea to preserve all economic ties, which have existed between the former Soviet republics, without any exception. He is in favor of "rational mutually beneficial ties on a market basis. A legal economic and finance field should be formed for this purpose."

Ukraine Not Seeking Control of Nuclear Weapons

*LD0806211093 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian
1613 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Excerpts] President Leonid Kravchuk is convinced that parliament will ratify the START I treaty and that it will adopt a decision on Ukraine acceding to the Lisbon protocol. This was stated by Anton Buteyko, head of the president's international affairs office, at a briefing at the Ukraine Foreign Ministry today. [passage omitted]

Replying to questions regarding control [kontrol] over nuclear weapons on CIS territory, Anton Buteyko noted that Ukraine does not have and is not striving for operational control [kontrol] and is only implementing administrative control. [passage omitted]

Expert Wonders If Ukraine Has Gone Nuclear

*MK1006102093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jun 93 p 2*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Mukhin of the journal ARMIYA, under "Carte Blanche" rubric: "Can Ukraine Become a Nonnuclear State? Very Soon All Conditions May Be Ripe for the Republic To Become a De Facto Nuclear Superpower"]

[Text] The current problems regarding the Ukrainian parliament's attitude to the START I Treaty are reduced by many to the understanding that its adoption of the terms of this treaty automatically makes Ukraine a nonnuclear state. Indeed, in Lisbon on 23 May 1992, Ukraine, among the other four "nuclear" republics of the former USSR, signed an agreement and a protocol whereby it becomes a full-fledged participant to the treaty and also accedes to the terms of the START I Treaty. In a special message to the U.S. President it assumed an obligation within the first seven years after the enactment of the START I Treaty to abolish all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive armaments. Meanwhile the current problems around the fate of the nuclear legacy of the USSR located in the republic are seen as the beginning of a difficult and long road that may not necessarily lead to Ukraine's delivering on its promises made in Lisbon and to an outcome welcome to the world community.

The problem here is not only that in violation of the assumed obligations a few days ago L. Kuchma, addressing the Ukrainian parliament, proposed that a temporary nuclear status be established for Ukraine or that this is demanded by 162 Ukrainian deputies. It is not ruled out that the ongoing "nuclear bickering" in the Ukrainian parliament are protracted battles, as they say,

merely of a tactical character. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the plan to turn Ukraine into a nuclear state is being covertly carried out already.

From the point of view of the republic's interests, this state of affairs does not lead to any great contradictions or questions. For instance, why should Ukraine not revise its geopolitical importance and take a new look at its role in Europe and the world? In terms of its population size, comparable to France, and in terms of the nuclear warheads located on its territory, exceeding France and Great Britain taken together, it asks itself, with the voice of its patriotically minded newspapers: Would it not become a "colossus with feet of clay" after the abolition of its nuclear and strategic weapons?" Ukraine, apart from its aspiration to obtain nuclear security guarantees, wants to be able to ensure these guarantees by itself.

This must be why, when preparing for the Lisbon meeting in early 1992, it took action to "privatize" strategic missile and long-range aviation units which were at the time part of the single CIS strategic forces. As of now the units and formations of the 43d Strategic Forces army have been transferred under Ukraine's jurisdiction; the majority of army officers have sworn the Ukrainian military oath and become citizens of the republic. The same happened with the units of the former USSR long-range aviation division stationed in Ukraine.

The question arises: Why should Ukraine, which has expressed the intention to abolish nuclear and strategic weapons within seven years, place under its protection the officers of strategic missile units whose fate has already been predetermined? This apparently means that both the officers and the state are hoping for something. Just what they are hoping for becomes more or less clear when one analyzes the new structure of military training in the republic. For example, the Higher Military Engineering Missile Forces Academy, which was recently created as part of the Air Defense Military Engineering Academy, and the Military Aviation Radio-Electronics Schools under the Kharkov Military University, will be training, in addition to other specialists, officers specializing in missile and space systems and complexes. As we can see, a long-term professional basis is being laid down for missile forces. Ukraine would hardly be spending its precious karbovantsy on training missile operation specialists if it wanted to rid itself fully of strategic weapons.

So far, however, Ukraine's control over the nuclear weapons located in the republic is limited. As L. Kravchuk recently said in an interview with TIME magazine, he can block a missile launch from Ukraine's territory not by technical or mechanical means but by an order, a command. At present the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR are de jure and de facto controlled by Russian President B. Yeltsin and Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. The missiles located on Ukraine's territory (just like in Kazakhstan and Belarus) have been taken off alert

duty and transferred to the reserves. But this situation may not be continued for long.

The Ukrainian special services are making no secret of the fact that one of the main directions in their activity involves "attracting" former USSR officers to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The main efforts by the military intelligence service are primarily concentrated on maintaining advanced, highly effective new-generation weapons and military equipment, whose production in Ukraine is complicated by the absence of military manufacturing facilities there. This primarily refers to missile and aviation equipment, communication means, and maintenance and operations bases. The fruits of this work are, as they say, plain to see.

In spite of the fact that in February 1992 during the "privatization" and special treatment by special services, three-quarters of commanders and pilots of the long-range heavy bomber aviation regiment near Uzin refused to take orders from the Ukrainian leadership and asked the CIS Joint Armed Forces commander-in-chief to do everything in his power to prevent the division from falling under Ukraine's jurisdiction. Today Colonel G. Kotlyar, commander of the heavy bomber division, in an interview with the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's newspaper NARODNA ARMIY stated that the formation is ready to carry out a combat mission and protect the people of Ukraine. Within a year the sovereign Ukrainian strategic bombers division, whose personnel had been halved, has managed to restore its combat readiness and to replenish its ranks almost entirely with the "defectors" from the CIS countries and Russia.

As though in response to the opponents from the Russian military leadership who state that Ukraine is not capable of operating heavy bombers since it lacks many technical servicing means and documentation, Ukraine is publishing stories and reports in the press about how strategic bombers are flying in Ukraine's skies and how they are being serviced and maintained.

The question suggests itself here: If Ukraine has fully mastered the operation of heavy bombers and the long-range aviation division is capable of accomplishing combat missions, then with what means—using conventional weapons, or nuclear bombs and missiles whose total stocks in the republic approximate 200 units? If Ukraine has broken the codes set on nuclear aviation ammunition, this means that the republic has de facto become a nuclear power.

The United States is offering Ukraine financial assistance after the ratification of the START I Treaty to dismantle the missiles, which is nearly 10 times less than the required sum cited by Ukrainian experts. According to Ukrainian specialists, to eliminate nuclear warheads some \$2 billion is needed, and \$3 billion to destroy the silos. Maybe, indeed, the Ukrainian leadership has good reason not to waste itself away on making promises on the START I Treaty and not to "yield to the miserly handouts from across the ocean?" This question in some form or another is today confronting many of those who have something to do with the fate of nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, in order to create an autonomous nuclear weapons control system and also a system to produce and test these weapons, and so forth, at least \$40 billion would be required. For the sake of comparison, in 1992 the Ukrainian treasury received a mere \$167 million in export revenues. The income of the agricultural sector in 1993 is expected to reach \$30 billion.

CYPRUS

Chechenis Said To Traffick Uranium Via North Cyprus

NC0706094293 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek
7 Jun 93 p 18

[Report by Khriso Andoniadhou—all Checheni names as transliterated]

[Text] The pseudostate of Rauf Denktas offers protection to the Russian mafia who illegally traffick large quantities of uranium to the West; it is also not to be ruled out that quantities of uranium are channeled to Europe via the occupied areas. Specifically, Denktas' pseudostate has very close relations with the Russian mafia who are led by the Chechen Republic.

Asil Nadir [Turkish Cypriot tycoon who fled UK suspected of fraud] and his lawyer Mentos Aziz, who is considered to be the liaison between the Chechenis and the occupied areas, play a leading role in these links. Asil Nadir is also said to be a uranium dealer with [Adnan] Khashoggi. I SIMERINI wrote about this recently, republishing in translation a report from the Turkish newspaper AYDINLIK.

At the same time, I SIMERINI has evidence confirming the close relations between the Chechenis and the pseudostate which is visited almost the whole year round by Checheni leaders who keep and protect the Russian mafia. The occupied areas were visited last year by Chechenistan's Prime Minister Mamadayev, Chechen Republic President Dudayev and a 16-member delegation, and Foreign Minister Etim who had contacts with the pseudostate's commerce minister. The occupied areas were also visited by Checheni Culture Minister Toutoev while the Chechni cultural liaison official also had contacts. The illegal regime [of Denktas] recently gave houses to 50 people from the former Soviet republic for permanent settlement in the coastal area of Lapithos.

According to existing information, Russia itself is aware of the relations between the Russian mafia and the Checheni leadership who also maintain relations with the nationalistic mafia whose roots are in Turkey. Russia also knows that the mafia traffick in uranium from Kazakhstan. Mentos Aziz, Asil Nadir's lawyer, appears to be the liaison between the Chechenis and the pseudostate. These relations have been confirmed by Russian diplomats. It has not been confirmed as yet which country has received uranium which was trafficked via Istanbul to European and Eastern countries. What has been confirmed is that large quantities of such uranium were stolen from the Russian Army and were sold in the shape of bricks, at outrageous prices depending on the buyer.

DPRK Reportedly Boosts Range of Nodong, Sells to Iran

*SK0806083693 Seoul YONHAP in English
0814 GMT 8 Jun 93*

[Text] Tokyo, June 8 (YONHAP)—North Korea has extended the range of its modified Scud-B missile, the Nodong No. 1, to 1,300 kilometers, a Japanese newspaper said Tuesday.

In a Washington-dated story, the SANKEI SHIMBUN quoted the Israeli ambassador to Washington as saying that

“North Korea is selling Iran Nodong No.1 missiles of which range was extended by 300 km.”

“If the report that the Nodong No. 1 has a 1,300 km range is true, most Japanese cities, including Tokyo, are within the reach of North Korean missiles,” the SANKEI pointed out.

Israeli military officials were visiting Japan in succession to swap intelligence with the Japanese Government on North Korea’s missile exports to Iran, the SANKEI said.